Degrowth Public Policies

Contents

1. Introduction

2. Context: Why Degrowth Public Policies?

2.1 Roles

2.2 Instruments

2.3 Principles

2.4 The Other

2.5 Decision Making Processes

3. Final Remarks: Descaling public policies?

Introduction

Degrowth movement claims for a society that is not driven by consumerist ideals (one where growth of production is needed to satisfy ever-growing consumption levels and public policies are used in order to support this purpose). Instead, it advocates for broader considerations of well being (that may not be necessarily directly translated into economic goods), horizontal decision-making processes, and sustainable use of resources (to guarantee the livelihoods in the territories over-time). The way that the commons and of the public policies that act upon them are to be conceptualized and systematized has to be rather different from the approach given within the prevailing growth-oriented system. Here, we shall present a proposal for discussion, about how we should consider degrowth public policies.

This paper is organized as follows. In the first chapter, we will try to analyze how growth-oriented policies arose, which was the system they were trying to support, and the problems this creates. In the second chapter, we present a degrowth proposal. For this, we start by overviewing the roles and instruments associated with public policies, and what should be the principles applied to them under a degrowth approach. It is further argued that, as the commons are to be comanaged through horizontal processes, one has to avoid constructions of the other, characteristic from growth-societies, that moralize the subjects (as if they didn't have agency) that are participating in decision-making processes, when they are supposed to be peers. At last, there is a proposal of how to consider decision-making within a degrowth approach. Here, it is argued that the focus should be on needs rather than on interests, where improving localization and territorialization (decreasing the distance between subjects and objects of decision) helps designing solutions. Additionally, stakeholders are to be made as authentic subjects, and in order to do so, we have to guarantee spaces of deliberation. Finally, the quality of a decision-making is to be analyzed in terms of the process through which it was produced, instead on «what» a good decision looks like. For this, we shall use following criteria: quality of perception (problem analysis), speech (e.g. transforming conflicts into controversies), and action (decision making act upon concrete cases).

Context: Why Degrowth Public Policies?

Especially after the second world war, in the West, the notion of development (or of any concept referring to social goals) has been connected to the idea of economic growth. This has been manifested not only in terms of the theory produced (e.g. the trickle-down effect, State inefficiency in the allocation of resources, Keynesian economics, etc.), but also in orientation guidelines given to public policies. The concept of economic growth has implied that the main purpose in life of any “individual’” is to maximize his/her utility, that is, to maximize consumption (which necessarily implies maximizing production), and therefore, that the more material wealth a person has, the better she is in life.

In 1944, in the Bretton Woods conference, when IMF and the World Bank were created, GDP (Gross Domestic Product) became the standard measurement for sizing the economy of any country. The GDP is an indicator that intends to measure all the production of goods and services during the period of one year in a given State/region/locality. It represents the income of the population, and therefore, is an indicator for the capacity to buy (purchasing power).

In a geopolitical period marked by the Cold War, neocolonization and the industrialization processes taking place, a utilitarian, individualistic and materialist reading of man was widely promoted in Western societies (e.g. consumerist ideals like the American dream). Following these notions, GDP started representing not only “the size of the economy”, but also the well-being of any population. The promotion of growth (of the binomial consumption/production) became the ultimate purpose of public policies and the way to evaluate how well a country is. The narrative used by the main institutions (national and international) was directly connecting growth with development by using these two terms interchangeably, and implicitly imposing an ideal of development, even if, in principle, they should represent two very different ideas: one (growth), that can be reduced to something used to compare any society (how much is produced within the formal economy in one year, and therefore, how much can people buy?); and the other (development), whose meaning greatly varies among societies and persons in general (what do people want for their lives and are they reaching “it”?).

Using growth as the hegemonic narrative orienting public policies was therefore a way of confining societies to a model of organization that promotes consumerism, hereby strengthening the capitalist system, with what it has entailed, for example:

• large-scale production-model (e.g. large factories instead of small workshops), based on private ownership of the means of production (capital and physical assets) and on wage-labour (where large segments of the population are excluded from capital ownership and confined to sell their labour power in exchange of wage), which leads to a reduction of the share of profits/surplus that goes to salaries/workers, deepening the inequalities in the access to factors of production and resources, in general;
• large-scale distribution centers (malls, outlet stores, hypermarkets, etc. owned by large companies) instead of small shops/groceries (owned by the workers of those shops), reducing negotiating power of small producers against large retailers (monopsony market structures);
• development of banking system (to provide access to credit (to finance consumption) and financial markets/products (to finance investment of companies to produce more);
• polarized demography with depopulation of the rural areas and emergence of metropolitan areas (to provide labour force to factories and other large-scale structures). In larger cities, normally there is less trust/proximity between people (leading to monetization of social relationships, less importance of informal networks, more individualism, higher dependency on State and centralized services, etc.), more dependency from external resources (e.g. importing food from the countryside and more need for oil for transport of persons and goods), more distance to power structures (many voters for one government), higher need for bigger infrastructures (roads, sewage, water systems, etc.);
• pressure in natural resources by promoting ever-increasing consumption;
• wars between geopolitical blocks or within regions in order to control natural resources (middle east is a constant example for the last three decades);
• globalization of the political system, putting people further away from decision centers (EU, WTO, WHO, etc.);
• education based in the competition of individuals, meritocracy, and ideas like “success” and “failure”, that are to prepare people for a fight for the best working positions and careers, in a “World” where the “best” will find their place, and others will inevitably “fail”. Overlooking structural barriers that impede the equal access to resources, this argument is a way of justifying social injustices: those that do not have something did not work hard enough for it.

Combining industrialization and participation in global trade was and still is considered by the mainstream politics as the strategy needed to promote this growth-driven society. The differences of the disposable income between regions (one of the main questions for regional planning) was seen as a consequence of the differences in the access to markets and production factors; and it was considered that in the long-run these disparities would be mitigated if the mobility of the production factors was facilitated, and if the regions would become more “open” and “competitive” (i.e. liberalization of labour markets, privatization of the commons, of social services, etc.). It was then believed that the production of wealth on the bases of individual maximization of consumption combined with “natural” processes of redistribution would result in a more “efficient” society/economy, and therefore in an increase of well-being for all.

Enabled by cheaper energy inputs and lower transport costs, the economic transformations that have been occurring since the 70’s due to the openness of markets and the withdraw of economic barriers have deepened this tendency. This originated a productive structure where the production scale got larger and larger and the value chains were globalized. A new “international division of labor” was in the making; a result of company and factory displacements from places where the production factors where more expensive to the places where they were cheaper. As a consequence, not only the State and organized workers lost negotiation power before multinational enterprises, but also many factories and enterprises were closed due to the displacements. This led to a structural raise of unemployment (happening in Europe since the 70’s) and, consequently, to a decrease of fiscal revenues which affected the capacity to sustain the social model designed to fulfil the flaws of the capitalist system, the social injustices and tensions it created. Moreover, the new and ever-changing demographies promoted by strong migratory processes (i.e. rural to urban, south to north, within the north) implied a mobility-based system, where “human capital” (not people) moves to where it can get better payments, weakening the social ties between people and hindering the emergence of informal networks and solutions, that could minimize the consequences of the financial and environmental crises created by such a growth paradigm.

Already in the end of the 60’s the ideas around the notion of development started to be demystified. On one hand the way one measured (or “calculated”) development – that is, the notion one had about development – could not continue to be anchored in the growth of the production. On the other hand there should be different ways to “achieve development” and not only the “western way” – industrialization, urbanization, the “green revolution” in agriculture (the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, heavy machinery, etc.), attraction of foreign investment, market openness to external commerce, etc. However, concerning the formulation of policies the situation didn’t change (see, for example, the objectives formulated for the first and second development decade of UN). Although many different theories have arisen since the 70’s - Agropolitan Development, Basic Needs approach, Development from Below, Dependency/Underdevelopment theory, etc. - the use of such concepts went unnoticed in the formulation of public policies. The lack of interest by governments, the “experimentalism” of some of the proposals, the geopolitical fights, and the importance given to the mathematization of knowledge are factors that concur to the inhibition of public action aimed at the promotion of “another development”.

Therefore, the main role of mainstream public policies, especially in the Western World, is still today to promote economic growth, while providing the minimum social services to compensate the imbalances produced by the capitalist system, hereby keeping social peace and power structures untouched. Yet, nowadays, much of the conditions that facilitated policies centered on economic growth (such as cheap energy, colonialism/neocolonialism, high liquidity of the States, stable markets and external conditions, or the existence of “free spaces” to the externalization of the negative effects of growth) are not applicable anymore. This aspect, together with the development for lower scales technologies (DIY, DIT, etc.), concerns regarding participation, and a closer attention of the civil society to the ecological issues (often consequence of unrestrained growth), reinforce the need to consider public policies in a very different way to the growth approach, in how we conceptualize their roles, principles, and the decision-making processes they involve.

Degrowth Public Policies

Public policies can be briefly defined as the governing policy within a society to manage its commons and to respond to a perceived problem by a constituency (individual or group with a specific interest or need - see discussion below in 2.5). The term “commons” refers to all the resources, either natural (such as land, water, air) or cultural (e.g. money, public infrastructures, etc.), which are accessible to all members of a given society. The commons are considered to belong to all members and therefore should be commonly managed, hereby contrasting to private ownership, in terms of their rationale. In principle, in Western societies these resources are managed by State institutions, as State is considered the ultimate owner of the resources and the legitimate entity to define how they should be used. Yet, a constituency that does not see its interests or needs satisfied may consider to organize and constitute its own commons and manage them, and therefore management of commons may not be an exclusive role of State.

In the paradigm of a growth-oriented society, the role that the people of a given locality/region have in the definition of its’ own future is very limited. The power to implement policies has been gradually transferred to bigger and further away decision centers, i.e. at first, to the capital of the country, and afterwards to supranational institutions, normally regional blocks (EU, Mercosur, Asean, Nafta). Local authorities have become mere vehicles, whose mission is to implement the decisions/strategies that come from above (i.e. outside the locality/region), in order to accommodate and facilitate the entrance of a given “development model”, that is to apply to all - leaving minor considerations about the adaptation to the local context to be performed by the local authority.

On the contrary, within a degrowth perspective, a strong emphasis is to be put on the autonomy of localities for the management of the commons. This allows, in what concerns public policies: a more direct perception of problems to be addressed; a direct concern regarding over or misuse of resources for their availability in the future; the generation of solutions that are designed and managed by the local population and organizations (public, private, social, informal); reducing verticality and hierarchization within decision-making processes; understanding political policies as processes of cooperation that deal with shared needs, rather than resulting from competition between different interests.

Thinking of a degrowth approach to policy-making also implies broader consideration of well-being than the one advocated by consumerism (the ideology that connects the idea of “good life” with the acquisition of more and more products and services). By doing so, the needs to produce are reduced, hereby decreasing the pressure over resources and the conflicts that consequently arise. Therefore, and as shall be discussed, the growth of the production (GDP) is not an indicator that should drive policies, as the satisfaction of needs is not necessarily related to the creation of economic goods.

After decades (if not centuries) of policies following the very opposite principles, degrowth public policies are not expected to naturally emerge, neither as an initiative by the installed power structures (as they have been there for long and are benefiting from a different system), nor from people  (which were already educated within competition and meritocracy principles, and are not used to be part in co-management systems but to use centrally provided public/private services - for which they have contributed only through taxes, not having a direct participation). Therefore, we do not expect by starting this discussion, that all of a sudden these ideas will immediately and widely be put in place. On the contrary, we have to take in consideration that this still involves a long learning process, as there are not many examples of successful “degrowth” policies that can serve as an example, and ideas are far from being systematized. We have to keep humility about what “degrowth”, as a movement, is in fact capable to address, in order not to deceive those that have trusted in the development of alternatives to the mainstream system through the creation of over-expectations that cannot be maintained.

At last, we have to advert the reader that given the cultural background of the authors of this text, that the conceptualization and logic beyond the terms used is based in the Western vision and history, so ideas like “public”, “policy”, “law”, “education”, and many others may be completely different (and even outdated) in other cultural perspectives.

Before we enter in the systematization of degrowth principles, we will introduce some considerations regarding what we perceive as the main roles and instruments of public policies.

Roles

We consider that public policies are instruments that serve for two main purposes.

• Role 1 - Promote cooperation. Public policies may be required whenever different stakeholders (those that are involved in or affected by a course of action) share common needs that are more easily addressed collectively.
• Role 2 - Mediate conflicts. Conflicts may arise from the scarcity of resources (water, soil, money, etc.), different needs, moral values, etc.

In a degrowth perspective, one considers that the main role of public policies is to promote and instrumentalize cooperative processes, as the conflicts of interests should be lessened by:

- reducing the emphasis on growth of consumption/production (and therefore, reducing the need and conflicts for natural resources);

- promoting an education that privileges the idea of cooperation (instead of competition);

- respecting the fact that people have different perspectives and that this does not entail that people are necessarily in conflict - there is no need of a common vision/ideology in order for people to cooperate.

Yet, Role 2 is inevitable because whenever the resources are scarce and have different uses, the different ways they can be managed will benefit/harm in various ways and degrees the stakeholders, which may create conflicts of interests.

Instruments

Here, we shall consider instruments to implement public policies, independently from whether they are applied by State institutions or by other forms of organization to manage commons (e.g. cooperatives, associations, informal groups, etc).

In order to promote Role 1 (Cooperation), public policies can be materialized in the form of:

a) construction and maintenance of infrastructures

Infrastructures are defined as the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities needed for the operation of a society.

If they are to be built to benefit many people in a given area, it makes more sense to be implemented and managed collectively, instead of each one doing what they need for themselves. A common strategy can be more effective to respond to the issues they try to address, and include the various perspectives of the stakeholders. Since that often these infrastructures serve to manage natural resources, if they are privatized the access to decisions regarding their use is confined to those that own them, excluding many that need or are affected by them. Therefore, it makes sense to keep them public as well as the infrastructures required for their use, in order to respect the principle that public policies are to act upon resources (i.e. commons) that belong to all members of societies, and that therefore equal access to decision regarding their use must be ensured (no stakeholder should be excluded).

Examples of infrastructures: water systems (collection, treatment and distribution), sewage, roads, railways, electrical grids, ports, airports, schools, public spaces.

b) co-ownership and co-management of equipment and facilities

Often different persons or groups (associations, cooperatives, informal groups, enterprises, etc.) have the need for equipment or facilities that will only be used sometimes (for specific social events, production of goods, provision of services, or other purposes). Given that these are not needed all the time, their use can shared. The purposes, ways and ideologies implied while using such equipments or facilities may vary greatly among users, but still users can benefit by sharing their use and find common principles for their management, responding to the various needs.

How they are managed and funded can assume many forms according to the situations and needs. The use can be completely free of charge (e.g. fully-financed through taxes, costless maintenance), or imply a contribution. It may require employing persons or this may be done using volunteers among users. For implementation, it may require raising funds for the initial investment (e.g. using crowdfunding, taxes, etc.) or use donations in kind or labour by members.

Examples of equipments or facilities: tables, chairs, large tents, sound studios, solar panels, certified kitchens, fire stations, mills (for oil, cereals, wine, etc.).

c) provision of social services

There are services in societies that are offered by private entities, but for ideological principles in favour of universal access to a high quality system (because they are considered so important the human life, they should not only be accessible for those that can afford) or for practical reasons (e.g. in order to reduce costs for users) -, they are considered to be offered as a service with free access (or at a low cost) to “all” members of that State/Group/Territory, that owns/manages it collectively. In this sense, this concept refers to those services that can or should be socialized.

Given that they represent a need to all, if a society/group manages its own service (by making it accessible to its members) then they do not have to pay profits to a private agent.

In growth-oriented approaches, these services can be considered to be offered by public entities in order to avoid too much social unrest (created by growth itself), so that the elites can keep their power, and therefore these services are destined to serve the most disadvantaged populations, offered with low quality, and without participation of citizens. Good quality services are to be offered by the private sector for those that can afford. Therefore, one has to be careful to distinguish this kind of assistencialism (up-down and supporting “growth”) from a degrowth approach regarding the provision of social services.

Example of social services: health care, education, social security, banking.

In order to instrumentalize Role 2, and mediate conflicts, public policies are normally materialized in law and corresponding enforcement systems.

d) laws and corresponding enforcement systems.

This should be the last resource of societies in order to ensure peace among citizens and the sustainable use and fair access to resources. Conflits normally arise in societies, either because resources are scarce or simply because people have different moral systems. Therefore, State institutions are often used to define what belongs to whom and how; what people can do as part of their freedom and what they cannot, among others. In real life, regulations need an enforcement system, either formal (by State or other legal entities), or informal. In both cases, a judging process is required when one suspects an infringement has occurred, and in case it was so, to define the sanction. This is a very delicate process because it implies strong legitimacy by the institutions/persons conducting the process, and also because the access to “justice” is not equal for all (for money or other reasons that give more power to some within a society), and also because what is fair or not, is a very subjective matter.

In a society where people share more perspectives (about fairness, right and wrong, etc.), trust and cooperate more (especially when they know each other for a longer time with positive experiences), and where there are not many social tensions (namely regarding access to resources), formal regulation and the corresponding sanctioning/repression systems may not be needed at all. So, ideally, a society would not need these regulations. Often they can be substituted by education or tackling the unfairness that is underlying the conflicts.

Examples of matters that are often regulated: trade relationships (ensure consumers protection, i.e. fairness in transactions, good measurement systems, etc.); the use of the commons (water, soil, land); social relationships (e.g. define what is crime and how to deal with it); property rights and succession law.

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Principles

For Public Policies to fulfil its’ roles within a degrowth perspective, using these instruments accordingly, we shall provide a small set of guiding principles to be used to orient us while designing policies as such and contrast with the growth-oriented approach:

1. the focus is on the well-being of citizens, on the services that support this (e.g. healthcare, education, etc.), and on the promotion of fair access to resources essential for living (land, water, etc.).

In the growth approach, the main focus of policies is to promote the increase of the binomial production/consumption of products and services (GDP), implying that needs are mostly material.

2. there should be an attempt to avoid uses that put at stake the availability of resources in the long-run (e.g. contamination of soil or water, overuse/extraction, etc.

As the objective is to grow production, also the objective is to facilitate the use/extraction of resources, even when this puts their long-run availability at stake;

3. cooperation, reciprocity and active participation of citizens are to be promoted in the design and management of public services;

In a growth perspective, citizens are seen as individuals acting in the pursuit of their individual satisfaction, so reciprocity is not seen as crucial, because monetary transactions are considered to produce the same and more efficiently. Simultaneously, citizens are clients of State, and State collects taxes to provide a service (e.g. good roads, health system), therefore participation in public services was substituted by the monetary relationships implicit in any market, and so citizens are not part of it - they opt or not to buy the services of the State and they are forced to contribute in the form of taxes.

4. equal power among citizens of a territory (independently of their nationality) and direct access in decision-making processes on the uses to be given to the commons;

As in growth societies, institutions also tend to grow and manage bigger and bigger regions with the same laws, policies, etc. Consequently, it’s each time more and more difficult for citizens to participate in the decisions that concern their natural resources or the use of their taxes (which investments are supported, subsidies are given, etc. - see example of E.U. and its structural funds, with money collected from citizens of all over Europe). In order to legitimate decisions there is a representation system (called “representative democracy” or “sephocracy”, characteristic of Western States), where citizens are represented in parties, which act as intermediaries between people and decisions.

5. given its’ capacity to enforce the law and collect taxes, State institutions are expected to manage the commons. However, in case that political authorities do not proceed under the principles 1. to 4., citizens should be able and capable to develop among themselves co-management systems for implementation of services or creation of infrastructures to respond to their needs, generating and managing their own commons, normally through the creation of associations or cooperatives;

“Public” in growth societies (or in any), normally is not really “public” if we define it as including all living within a territory. In EU countries, for example, often there is a “public health care system”, but there is a significant number of citizens that cannot have access to it, although they live, work and contribute for the respective territories (i.e. «illegal» immigrants). Additionally, States are often dominated by the interests of a few, and this may imply that the needs of many are not responded, that policies can even harm their livelihoods (namely by promoting an unsustainable use and unfair access to resources), or that groups are excluded from rights that a majority has.

6. each person is considered to have his/her own valid perspective of how resources should be used and what should be the objectives of public policies (even if it goes against principles 1. to 4.). Differences of perspectives do not mean that people are against each other, but rather that we have to understand that the opinion of "the other" matters as much as ours, that it is not irrelevant but rather part of our own.

Inside a growth hierarchical power structure, competition and opposition are favoured as a «spectacle» by impoverished settings for dialogue (e.g. mass media) which impairs the expression and acceptance of different views from different people (that don’t access them, or don’t share the same linguistic codes, etc.). Hence normalization occurs. Public debate is reduced to adversative forms of argumentation and privileges persuasion-based dialogue.

The Other

Considering that principle 4. of degrowth public policies, as proposed above, implicitly claims for horizontal structures, namely for peer-to-peer models, where each person is regarded as having agency (be capable or able to act on one's will), one has to take in consideration how in growth societies, “the other” was constructed, and how different types of dualities were built in order to separate persons. Overcoming this otherness is a crucial step to reach decision-making processes that in fact are based in the consideration that those involved are peers (where having different opinions is natural) and not counteracting forces (where one side claims for a superior opinion).

There are two main growth-related phenomena that led to the construction of “the other” as such, and that support two sorts of dualities: Duality West vs the Rest as a consequence and an efforto to legitimate colonialism/imperialism; Duality within the West, resulting from a political system based in sephocracy/representative democracy.

a) Duality West vs the Rest

One of the main consequences of economic growth, as already described, is the need of ever-more resources, both natural and human. In the last centuries, this was manifested in imperialist movements by Western States, namely colonialism, slavery and, after the Second-World War, in the forms of neocolonialism and in wars in strategic areas in terms of natural resources. In order to justify these conflicts and domination processes from one society to another, it was and still is required to construct a duality, opposing a certain “We” (white, Christian, civilized, democratic, etc.), and “the other” (white, infidels, not-civilized, corrupt, etc.).

This construction of the “other” is entrenched with both the story of modern science and imperialism and was used in order to justify slavery and other forms of exploitation and domination. In this sense, colonialism and modern Western science became close historical accomplices, since Academic Modern Knowledge could be understood simultaneously as a bi-product and a tool of colonial socio-political and epistemic violence (e.g. violence of knowledge production, that distort, stereotypes and generalizes “the other” as homogenously belaboured).

Anthropology, in particular, is historically linked with the imperialist process, as it not only collaborated intimately with(in) the colonial administrations through gathering and providing information about specific groups of people, but also because the discipline anchored its rationality in the (former) colonial territories electing and constructing, through the comparative mode, colonized populations as the “other” of time and history, in formal opposition to the scientist own place of enunciation as a white privileged European.

This process of studying and building difference as significant in the complex context of colonial power relations largely contributed to the essentialization and crystallization of cultures and communities as isolated unities, paving the way to the production of unequal and monolithic opposed unities based on ideas of europeanness and non-europeanness, civilization and barbarism. These oppositions were related with specific racist and evolutionist ideas of civilizational progress. It was this framework of Eurocentric knowledge that came to inform discourses about the West and the Rest, shaping the idea that European imperialism was a civilizational mission, process through which colonial violence was historically obliterated.

Throughout this process, European colonialism and its material and symbolic violence – where people were enslaved and slaughtered, cultures and habits were ripped apart – paradoxically restored Europe its own self-made image of a sociopolitical and moral locus of development, tolerance and progress. It is important to bear in mind that colonialism and transatlantic slavery were the main processes enabling the rise of Europe and its’ richness, since they allowed industrialization, the development of capitalism, of Europe and its hegemonic rationalities.

Therefore, colonialism was a time where specific models of development were imposed to the “other”, everything in favor of maximizing production and economic and social progress. For that, the “other” was constructed as an a-moral subject, without agency, represented as incapable of understanding its present or deciding about its own future, a child, a “primitive” subject needing (enlightened) guidance. As such, colonialism can be seen as a vigorous and violent attempt to impose global worldviews and models of doing, as well as of being and beavering.

Even though colonialism, as we knew it, finished after the wars of national liberation, its legacies and ruins persist through the hegemonic diffusion of Eurocentric knowledge in public spaces and common knowledge, as well as in political structures and so forth. For that, it is important to be vigilant and to be able to target and deconstruct ancient rationalities in order to establish new possibilities of thought, imagination and creation.

b) Duality within the West

Other consequences of growth were the demographic polarization (with metropolitan areas becoming bigger and bigger), and States that dominated larger and larger territories (which requires more complex political processes and management systems, larger infrastructures, etc.), becoming increasingly organized in supranational organizations. As the scale of management of the resources increased, also the decision-making processes had to have more intermediaries and hierarchies. In this direction, the political system that most of Western States are based on emerged: the representative democracy (sephocracy), where the elected officials (acting as intermediaries), normally organized in the form of parties, represent groups of people, in the proportion to the number of votes they got. Then, these elected parties represent the people in all the matters (social, economical, environmental, geopolitical, etc.) for a period of time (usually 4 years), until new elections, where they try to get more votes than the others. Each party, in principle, embeddeds an ideology.

When the objective is to persuade/convince the majority of people for one's party/ideology (arguing that it is superior to others), it strengthens the idea that we, as persons, are competing in the society between our worldviews and political perspectives, where “the other” is either with or against me. However, most of the matters that affect the management of the commons do not require that we share the same ways of describing and desiring how the entire “World” should be, but rather that we concretely address an issue that affect various stakeholders in different ways.

In an approach that evokes peer-to-peer and horizontal structures, as promoted within degrowth premises, each of the stakeholders is considered to have a valid opinion and there is a dialogue in order to find a solution. If we consider our opinion superior to other stakeholder, we are in a vertical system and we are not peers anymore, so such attitude (convincing to one's ideology/worldview) has to be avoided.

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These two dimensions of the construction of the Other (West vs the Rest and within the West), even though related to different histories of oppression and operating different rationalities (e.g. since the first one is deeply rooted on colonialist and racist ideologies), raise many important questions regarding a Degrowth approach, in order to promote de facto peer-to-peer models, avoiding imposition of models and one-truth models (like in growth-societies), social evolutionist perspectives, and any sort of epistemic violence, that can impede inclusive decision-making processes.

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Many expressions used by movements/people that propose to be themselves alternatives to the capitalistic construction tend to unconsciously and without bad intentions reinforce this otherness. In order to introduce this discussion, we will analyse an expression that is often used, “save the world”, and how it reinforces both dualities.

1. What is the “World”?

What if we do not know what the World is, because: it is too big and complex to be described? too different from place to place? always changing? each person has its own perspective of what the World is?

2. What should be it saved from?

• Are we close to the apocalypse? What are the causes for the “end of the World”?
• If the “end of the World” is a metaphor, and if we claim that we know what we are saving it from, does it imply that we know what the “World” should be?
• Can we define what such a broad and complex concept like the “World” should be, in more than just the sum of some normatives (ideal standards or models)/generalizations such as: social currencies, urban farming, permaculture, maximum salary ceilings, basic income, live in love, no cars, etc.?
• Are these normatives always promoting degrowth? Can’t, for example, the creation of a social currency, in certain contexts, lead to more market-based consumption and less gift or barter economy?

3. What if someone (in our locality or in other part of the “World”) does not have the same idea of how the World should be “saved”, can we force them to our Worldview, or impede them to vote or to express their opinion because they are “wrong”?

• Did he/she lose agency? Why can we impose, does it imply that we have a superior Worldview? Who entitled us with it, science? Isn’t it again a form of epistemic violence?
• When that happens, are we still in a peer-to-peer model?

4. Why do we use apocalyptical discourses as such?

• Do we need to frighten people for them to listen to us?
• Can’t we discuss the issues that affect people, giving our opinion, without telling that otherwise (if they don’t follow us) the World will end?
• Is this is a new way of moralizing the other in order to impose a model, and avoid discussion?

5. Can an apocalyptical and ideological discourse (whether it promotes “degrowth” or any other concept) be used by opposite forces, namely by the already established economic power (that it tries to create an alternative for)?

• If degrowth becomes a sum of normatives or ideas, can it be used by the politicians in order for them to defend themselves that they are promoting an alternative (just by implementing social currencies, urban gardens, maximum income ceilings, etc.), even if no structural change really occurs?
• Can this in the long run empty the political power of using the word degrowth?

What if we cannot, do not want, nor feel the need of “Saving the World” (see box), can we still collaborate with other people in order to solve our problems or to manage the commons? Does everyone need to have the same ideology/worldview in order to collaborate or live in peace in the same society? Can we interact with the “other” without trying to colonize/persuade him/her to follow our idea?

If degrowth is to radically break with Growth impository and violent approaches to make the expansion of its own model, overlooking diversity of perspectives and needs, it cannot have any sort of “universalistic and normative character” (what the “World” should be), otherwise it becomes a new flag within a battle. It has rather to break with this idea of the “other”, of these dualities that perpetuate conflicts even between those that share common needs. Overcoming this idea of “the other” is therefore a step towards new ways of considering decision-making processes not based in imposition (a game of winners and losers), but one that in fact considers all as peers, providing a real space of dialogue, where differences are allowed and concrete problems are put at the table in order to be discussed and solved, apart from our different (ideological and subjective) Worldviews, and without the presumption of finding perfect, universal, eternal solutions.

Decision making processes

There are different models and methods of decision-making. In the growth paradigm most methods of decision-making assume the economic rationality model, where human beings are perfectly rational agents; the decision will be completely rational in means-ends sense; there is a complete and consistent system of preferences that allows a choice among alternatives; there is a complete awareness of all the possible alternatives; Probability calculations are neither frightening nor mysterious; there are no limits to the complexity of computations that can be performed to determine the best alternatives;

Several critiques of this model and its underlying theoretical assumptions have been developed, from the most mild to the most radical, even if that does not mean that this economic model of rationality is overthrown.

• Bounded theory of rationality acknowledges cross-cultural differences and embodied rationality;  in real world people don’t behave as pure rational agents and economic theory needs to take that into account.  
• Psychosocial model of rationality emphasizes that  humans are a bundle of emotions, instincts, feelings, unconscious desires (a model which found its way into neuromarketing, for e.g.).
• Communicative rationality explores rationality as the outcome of a communicative process; it is not independent from language and action (Habermas).
• Scientific rationality follows a number of logical principles, experimental and social procedures (like peer-review, for e.g.) which define rationality.

The latter two forms represent a tendency towards a less substantive theory of rationality (what thoughts, desires, beliefs are rational) and a more procedural theory of rationality (how to think rationally?).

Given limited time in formulating policies and addressing public problems, the economic rationality model coupled with representative democracy along with their underlying assumptions have been the norm and have hold its power to explain and account for different types of anomalies.

The theoretical move towards degrowth decision-making mindset needs to question a lot of assumptions in the economic rationality model and the ensuing rational choice and decision-making processes. For e.g. What is the role of rationality in decision-making? What role does «imagination» play in rationality? What is the biopolitical meaning of a convivial society? Are all desires in the same scale? How to figure out what you really want? Are needs the expression of  rational desires? Is need a better basis than interest to form constituency in decision-making forums?

Needs vs Interests

Well-being depends on satisfying needs, and needs are not only material. From a cross-cultural perspective, it has been argued that all human needs can be categorized under one of these general headings: subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, creativity, identity and freedom (Manfred Max-Neef). Economic goods cannot satisfy most of these needs. Or, at best, they are what Max-Neef calls singular satisfiers: only one need at a time can be satisfied by the consumption of the economic good. In a predominantly materialistic view of needs, a state of need is depicted as deprivation.

Instead, we are invited to consider human needs as universal, and the satisfaction of those needs as what engages, motivates and mobilizes people. It is not the same as self-interest. Mainstream economics says that «every agent is actuated only by self-interest», with the imagery of the human being as purely egoistic coming to dominate the economic narrative. This cannot be the case here, since egoistic behaviour will inhibit the satisfaction of other needs like understanding, participation, etc. Or, the argument could be made that once needs are plural, self-interest (if defined as satisfaction of needs) can only be pursuited through ethical behaviour, in relation with others (needs of understanding, affection, participation). Forms of organization, political structures, social practices are as important as economic goods to satisfy needs. Hence, GDP is not an accurate indicator to measure human development.  

In this sense neither growth nor the production of economic goods can, by themselves, satisfy plural needs. In fact, they even can violate the satisfaction of needs or falsely satisfy them. Every satisfier can be classified as such: negative satisfier (violators, inhibitors, pseudo-satisfiers), positive satisfier (singular or synergetic).  For example, the need for protection can be satisfied with an «arms race», which is in fact a violator satisfier since it impairs the satisfaction of other needs (subsistence, freedom).  Overexploitation of resources is apparently connected with satisfaction of subsistence needs, but  it is, in fact, a pseudo-satisfier, since it will actually prevent the satisfaction of that need later on. Competition is an inhibitor satisfier, because while it satisfies the need for freedom, it inhibits the satisfaction of needs of protection, affection, identity, etc. Finally, positive satisfiers: in a materialistic view of needs, singular satisfiers predominate. E.g. You are hungry and you can satisfy your subsistence need with a sandwich (singular satisfier); Or, you can satisfy the same need with a picnic, which satisfies more than one need at a time (subsistence, affection, participation, etc.) - these are synergetic satisfiers.

Poor conception of what needs are, lead to privilege «interest» as the basis for rational behaviour. Language in use about political negotiation tends to use the notion of interest as a neutral concept to justify which people can be considered as stakeholders and have the right and the power to decide over a particular issue. Instead, we are suggesting that the notion of need could be a more fair basis to identify who can have a stake in a decision.

What is the object of decision making?

In terms of public policies one way to define it can be as res publica. Although this seems to refer only to «inanimate things» several theories have been successful in demonstrating that things are not things on its own, disconnected from contexts. Hence the emphasis on socio-technical systems (Latour and STS studies) or socio-ecological systems (Ostrom). A simple way of depicting this is by an example: constructing a road, a TGV line or an airport are public decisions with great impact on people’s everyday life. And it is the case that these impacts turn people’s everyday life also into objects of decision, into «things», into res publica. Austerity measures change people’s everyday life. The decision is depicted as one that is only about budget equilibrium and financial debt. Nevertheless, unemployment or poverty affect people’s lives, turning them into objects of decision, rather than subjects in decision-making.

The notion of commons is also defining a socio-technical, socio-ecological system. Instead of simply seeing the commons as discrete resources («simply material or intangible collective resources»), we understand them as «process of shared stewardship about things that a community possesses and manages in common or should do so» (Bollier), a whole system expressing a different paradigm of governance and resource management (encompassing real and engaged communities, resources and rules) and also a dynamic notion (a verb instead of a noun) that opposes itself to commodification (run by market and corporations ruling) and enclosure practices (also run by the State) .

«Commons» is a good example of how «things» or «resources» are deeply intertwined and ingrained with ways of living and social relations, and it can be a source of case studies for examining decision-making processes as much as the forefront of action-research when it comes to develop sound governance systems where people are no longer an object of decision-making by elected political bodies but are themselves authentic subjects in decision-making processes.    

The Tragedy of the Commons

The over-exploitation of a resource produces scarcity, poverty and a state of warfare (because if you run out of water you’ll carry on to get more, in another place - a logic of extensive domination).

People connected to the need of using the resource for their subsistence «know» exactly why not to over-exploit it, which may be defined as a rational use. But, what happens when different individuals have free access to a «common» resource? Will the sum of each individual’s independent rational use of the same resource be its depletion? The tragedy of the commons is example based - the overgrazing of common land - which adds strength to the argument. Conclusions follow that public/private ownership and laws (instead of free and open access) are the only ways to avoid this tragedy.

Firstly, we should make a point about the «relevance» in terms of over-exploitation of a resource of the situation depicted. Over-exploitation that degrowth is chiefly concerned about is what we call extractivism - hindering nature’s ability to regenerate itself - and the global inequalities that it entails - Industrialized economies outsource “nature”, seeking non-industrialized countries as the providers of natural resources (a form of colonialism). «Overgrazing» is not such case - because it is possible to regenerate pasture for the following years - hence, no “tragedy” follows - despite the negative consequences - they can be solved and, most importantly, reversed (tragic is about irreversibility). The sort of over-exploitation that can be properly seen as tragic it is not thus the type of exploitation connected with  the satisfaction of subsistence needs - but the one motivated by other type of interests, cheap energy, cheap labour, etc. The kind of stewardship that can safeguard resources from this kind of tragic exploitation is not given by clarifying ownership and property rights.

Secondly, we should question this notion of Commons - as abstract sum of individual independent actions towards the same resource. This way of representing the Commons is a reduction - its’ mathematization (calculus) strips out the anthropological richness of the real Commons. Studying community practices of sharing the use of wasteland will probably reveal not a tragedy, but the Triumph of the Commons, and  a valuable source of commons’ Right  - locals often come up with solutions to the commons problem themselves (Ostrom).  It is only when non-locals are using the same resources that these solutions can no longer be used. The collective use of the resource is more than the sum of individual uses, but even if we were only self-interested individuals we would often find ways to cooperate, because collective restraint serves both the collective and individual interests. Also in Game Theory evidence has been collected showing that cooperative behaviour is, on the long-run, more beneficial to the individual than competitive behaviour.

Participatory politics

The turn to more participatory politics is driven top-down (state/civil society) as well as bottom-up (grassroots and social movements). While the latter challenges more wholesomely the political systems foundations, legitimacy and institutional forms, and are chiefly concerned with the development of alternative political spaces, the first see the development of governance, through instruments of participation (public budgeting, strategic planning consultation, digital platforms) as the way to address the recurrent legitimacy crises in representative democracies.

More participatory democracies don’t mean that the belief system (economic model of rationality, GDP-based  measurement of development, growth as a «common good») necessarily changes. In fact, the need for participatory democracy is independent and it has been either reclaimed by people or institutionally instrumentalized to respond to the ever-recurring necessity of renewing the Social Contract.

There may be moments where the two intersect. See for e.g., Podemos! where a social movement coming out of 15-M turns into a political party, which then aims at entering the representative system; or, the «Urban Commons» in the city of Bologna, where a new regulatory framework was reached “Regulation on collaboration between citizens and the city for the care and regeneration of urban commons” which allows citizens to propose improvements, and the city to contract with citizens for key assistance in implementation and management. We sum up some general characteristics of both approaches (besides their possibility to intersect) in the next table.

There is a wider space open for deliberation (the type of dialogue that precedes decision-making) - either opposing decision-making by state and corporations, or supporting decision-making through participation in specific moments, which also doesn’t mean seizing the power to decide, or having equal access to decision-making forums. So, further questioning is needed for a deeper democracy.

How do we become authentic subjects of public decision making? We suggest three indicators for testing if deliberation spaces are void:  

• we must be able to produce counter-expertise (reliable sources of information)
• we must be able to also define rules of participation (we define and co-construct «public space» - the places where we collectively deliberate)
• we must be able to decide on real things (the outcomes of our decision-making processes  must link to real possibility to act and problem-solving)

Concerning methods of decision-making, the core of economic rationality emphasizes efficiency. One can compute decision-making (using the input of premises and rules to sort possible conclusions). In an utilitarian approach, a rational method to reach decisions consists in weighing pros and cons, in different moments, over a limited period of time (to ensure that possible outcomes are not forgotten), in order to maximize «utility» (benefit the biggest number). In computational approaches to decision-making processes evidence has been collected that more deliberation slow down decisions, but probably result in better decisions - or at least, people feel more satisfied with the decision made.    

We suggest that a qualitative approach to decision-making, instead of quantitative, is preferable from a degrowth point of view.

This qualitative approach can use a lot of different group-decision methods (consent, consensus, games, other) and different instruments (assemblies, work groups, etc.), it is not important to choose one particular form or another. Alternative political spaces are a valuable source for case studies in this matter. Another source is cultural diversity - western argumentation tradition is just one - a lot more exist and they can provide for other types of argumentative schemas (a principle of decolonizing the imaginary).  

When examining different processes of decision-making, overall, the important questions of a qualitative approach focus on:

• Effectiveness: the possibility to take real decisions and action, if needed. This means that if we enter decision-making we must be able to grasp the object of decision - resources within reach. But how can small groups («Commons» are one example), territorialization and localization strategies be used to oppose distance between subjects and objects of decision?
• Fair participation: equal power and access to decision-making. This means that holding a stake in a decision should follow rules other than having a particular interest - linking decision-making to satisfaction of needs -  and also that decision-making forums cannot be exclusive - consider the kind of access from different actors (old/young; individual/collective, tribes or corporations) with different capabilities (the digital divide, for example) and different decision-making traditions - that’s why people need also to have the right of defining the rules of participation and organizing public spaces for allowing appearance (Hannah Arendt) - which constitutes the political subject. Examples of limited access can be found both in bottom-up (required capabilities, architectonic barriers, argumentation schemas) and top-down approaches (power structure).  

Finally, in a qualitative approach good decisions matter as well, although we are not concerned with defining «what» a good decision looks like. Instead, we are concerned with the how. Thus, we explore different aspects of decision-making and are concerned with methods to improve the quality of each component in a decision-making process (and each cultural context will probably add to the stack of methods):  

• Quality of perception - enhancing the analysis of salient features in a given situation;
• Quality of speech - practicing polylogue and controversy-based argumentation;
• Quality of action - addressing complexity and the co-creation of rules of interaction;

a) In decision-making we need data and information; if data and information are produced and owned by groups of interest, or the state/agencies have pervasive access to data, or privileged access to mass media, etc. - then, information is not neutral; In order to take informed decisions we need also to be able to produce and share data/information, establish ways of inquiry, being able to question the descriptions, that is, it has to be possible to establish the premises of deliberative reasoning; at its most, this equates with the right to counter-expertise;

- Audits or mapping or participatory analysis are ways of producing such information.   

b) Public Policies are a cooperative, multi-agent argumentative setting; In this kind of setting conflicts also occur, but they do not need to be seen under the adversative paradigm (for one to win, another loses). Conflicts can be seen as controversies - which can turn into a win/win situation, whenever each point of view is, in its own turn, presented and considered. A kind of distributive principle is applied here, and different types of dialogue (inquiry, negotiation) as well as different forms of information (narratives, facts, arguments) are practised. The emphasis is put on collective construction of a decision, in face of uncertainty. The kind of adversative model of argumentation pervasive in western tradition, admits only one winner, (it privileges competition over cooperation), focus on possible attack forms to the competitive set of arguments (rebuttal, undermining, undercut, «ad hominem», straw man) and makes use of fewer types of dialogue (persuasion-based).      

c) Decision-making is a kind of practical reasoning, directly linked to actions. Concrete cases can offer intelligibility to decision-making. Decision-making does not require a rationality detached from the world. We should make an appeal to consider consequences of decision-making, not as abstract «impacts», but as concrete actions performed and lived by concrete subjects. This requires our subjective and empathic appreciation of decisions made. Emotions and imagination are as important in decision-making as logical reasoning. The gaps between reasons, decisions and actions (understood as flaws in the economic rationality model) can be fully experienced. Valuing this subjective aspect is an important element of practical wisdom - an aristotelian concept that can take up many forms.

- e.g. Performative Games;  

Final Remarks: Descaling Public Policies?

Big cities, big distribution and production structures, big infrastructures, distant decision making institutions, oil dependency, food insecurity, housing/property speculation, are all consequence of a growth-based society. The large scale structures promoted by growth offer the basic logic in which instruments of public policies are conceptualized and used while reducing to the act of voting the political participation of the large majority of the population.

Therefore, the definition of scale in public policies is a crucial element to make a rupture with growth-based structures, in order to promote participation and the sustainable use of resources.

Additionally, one has to deconstruct a very present idea in the political discourse, one that promotes consumerism, that is, if we consume more and more, we become happier. If consumption is not removed as the main and only objective in life, big infrastructures, social organizations, and centralized power structures will still be needed to support the production required to satisfy this consumption, and public policies will have to address the problems that such a system creates (e.g. ecological imbalances, fragile social structures, etc.).

The scale is also relevant regarding the demographic process of growth, that led to the fast emergence of big and dense metropolitan areas, highly dependent in terms of basic resources for living (water, energy, food), which often have to come from outside. The proportion of the population living in cities rose from 3% to 47% between 1800 and 2000. The number of cities with more than 1 million people rose from 83 to 468 between 1950 and 2007. The performance of public policies within degrowth premises is more difficult in these areas.

On the one side, in general, social relationships are weaker in bigger localities, as due to commuting and lack of proximity, people do not interact as often, nor are they as interdependent on resources. The lack of repetition in social and economical relationships makes more difficult the arising of forms of reciprocity, such as barter or gift economy that require more trust than monetary relationships. In the same way, knowing less each other’s neighbours reduces the acknowledgement of common necessities, and therefore becomes more difficult to mobilize and engage people in acts of cooperation. Big cities tend to be fragmented in many territories whose boundaries are difficult to grasp. People tend to pass over many of them in their daily life, not needing to participate actively in them, not even in the neighborhood where they live (often regarded as temporary, given house insecurity), which may not be the area where most social relationships (friendships, work, hobbies, shopping, etc.) take place. So, in this situation, territories are social spaces to be used and not to be constructed / participated.

On the other side, larger and more dense urban areas deal with many more complex issues. It is very different in terms of costs, management, and complexity of technology to build the infrastructures of a water, sewage, or transport system that has to satisfy needs for one million, one thousand, or one hundred people. The room to address different needs is very little in bigger localities, where people tend to be organized around interests - cooperation is only used to reinforce competition, and policy is reduced to a tool to mediate conflicts. Additionally, the level of technicalities required to implement big infrastructures or social systems reduce to experts the discussion of solutions, and public debate tends to become restricted and shallowed. At last, resources required for livelihood, like water or food, have to come from the outside the city. What is consumed in one place is too distant from the impacts it created where it was produced.  There is not an obvious direct link between the consumption of a good and the impacts of its production in the sustainable use of the commons involved for its production, e.g. how was it produced the food that I ate, and which impacts did this production had in landscape, water, soil quality, biodiversity, etc., maybe hundreds of kilometers away? In a economic transaction involving such a distance, the relationship between the need and the common seems to be mediated by money, which sizes the degree of effort to have access to something, including the negative externalities that it eventually created (monetizing social and environmental costs of producing in a determined way, i.e. everything has a price, even depleting a common). In practical terms, this means that “in case the land is not fertile anymore, one buys food produced somewhere else”. Therefore, it is more difficult in dense areas, highly dependent on external resources, to find concrete cases between needs and availability of local resources, that could be constituted and managed as commons.

It would be important to proceed systematizing how degrowth public policies can be designed in various different fields, i.e. the development of social services (namely health and education); co-management systems of infrastructures, equipments and facilities; and regulation (e.g. property rights, access to commons, etc.). As the experiences of alternatives to the dominant system emerge, we can use them to critically reflect upon their substance, the concrete need they try to respond, the process where it was constituted and addressed, rather than about the final forms / solutions that resulted (normative thinking). By doing so, one can verify whether the principles and the other considerations brought here regarding a proposal for a degrowth approach, are followed by these projects, and if not, whether they make sense or should be reconsidered.